By Eugene Davis
The Minority Caucus in Parliament has renewed and updated its demand for full disclosure over the alleged $1.7 billion loss recorded in connection with GoldBod operations, arguing that recent findings by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank make a parliamentary inquiry even more urgent.
At the centre of the Minority’s concerns are questions that, it says, remain unanswered: Who were the off-takers? What discounts were applied to Ghana’s gold, who approved them, and on what basis? What fees were charged or paid, and by whom? Most importantly, who ultimately bore the losses — GoldBod or the Bank of Ghana?
According to Jerry Ahmed Shaib, Esq., Second Deputy Minority Whip, the latest World Bank assessment provides further grounds for demanding answers.
In its 10th Ghana Economic Update: Reset for Growth, Sustaining Macroeconomic Recovery and Unlocking Transport for Transformation (August 2026, page 7), the World Bank describes GoldBod-related operations, among other issues, as a “significant and insufficiently monitored risk” to the Ghanaian economy.
That assessment, the Minority argues, sharpens rather than settles the questions surrounding the programme.
The Minority is therefore renewing its demands for:
A full parliamentary inquiry into GoldBod and the Bank of Ghana’s gold operations, with the power to summon officials and demand relevant documents, following the Speaker’s admission of the Minority’s motion.
Full disclosure of the identities of all off-takers, together with the discounts granted, the fees charged and the basis on which those terms were approved, including a clear determination of whether GoldBod or the Bank of Ghana ultimately bore each loss.
Systematic public disclosure of all contingent liabilities associated with the programme, as recommended on page 49 of the World Bank report.
Transparent accounting for all gold reserves under standard reserve-reporting practices, rather than maintaining arrangements outside the normal reporting framework.
A clear government plan and timeline to address the weaknesses identified by both the IMF and World Bank, including the broader risks associated with weak banks, COCOBOD’s financial position and Ghana’s exposure to movements in international gold prices.
The policy is not the problem
The Minority maintains that the underlying idea behind the Domestic Gold Purchase Programme was sound.
The programme was conceived under the Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo administration, with Dr Mahamudu Bawumia playing a central role in its design. Using Ghana’s gold resources to build reserves and support the stability of the cedi was, in principle, a forward-looking policy.
The Minority’s argument is therefore not that the concept of using gold to strengthen Ghana’s reserves was misguided. Rather, it is that a potentially sound policy has been undermined by poor implementation, inadequate oversight and weak risk management under the current administration.
The IMF has already put a number on the consequences.
In Ghana: Selected Issues (IMF Country Report No. 26/213, August 2026, page 10), the Fund found that the gold programme recorded losses of more than $1.7 billion in 2025 alone, equivalent to about 1.5 per cent of GDP. According to the Minority, those losses contributed to the Bank of Ghana being pushed into deep negative equity.
The World Bank’s assessment now raises a further question: how was the programme allowed to accumulate such risks without adequate monitoring and disclosure?
Its description of GoldBod-related operations as a “significant and insufficiently monitored risk” points beyond the size of the reported loss to the quality of governance surrounding the programme.
That distinction matters.
A large loss can occur even within a well-designed system when markets move sharply. But where a major public financial operation is identified as insufficiently monitored, the issue becomes one not merely of market risk but of institutional oversight, transparency and accountability.
The World Bank also found that gold reserves accumulated under the programme are not being tracked in the same manner as Ghana’s other reserves. On page 47, it identifies GoldBod and delays in reforms as continuing risks to the economy.
These concerns sit alongside other vulnerabilities identified in the report, including capital weaknesses among banks and specialised deposit-taking institutions, the financial difficulties confronting COCOBOD, and Ghana’s exposure to sharp movements in gold prices.
Taken together, the findings suggest that the issue is broader than a single $1.7 billion loss. They raise questions about whether Ghana’s public institutions have adequate systems to measure, disclose and manage the risks created by a large-scale gold purchasing and reserve-management programme.
From policy choice to accountability
The central issue for the Minority, therefore, is not whether Ghana should use its natural resources to strengthen its reserves. It is whether that policy is being implemented with the level of transparency, discipline and risk management expected of a programme involving public assets on such a scale.
A sound policy can still produce damaging outcomes when implementation is weak. The size of the reported losses makes it particularly important to establish exactly where the losses occurred, how transactions were structured, who benefited from them, and which public institution ultimately absorbed the cost.
The unanswered questions about off-takers, discounts and fees are consequently not peripheral details. They go to the heart of the programme’s accountability.
This is why the Minority says it welcomes the Speaker of Parliament’s admission of its motion. A parliamentary inquiry would provide the institutional mechanism to obtain the transaction records, summon the relevant officials and establish a verifiable account of what happened.
The latest World Bank findings strengthen that case.
They provide further independent evidence that the risks surrounding GoldBod operations require closer scrutiny and that the public deserves greater transparency about the management of the country’s gold and reserves.
The case for answers
The Minority’s position is ultimately straightforward: the objective of using Ghana’s gold to strengthen national reserves may be defensible, but the public must be able to see how the programme has been managed.
If more than $1.7 billion was lost in a single year, Ghanaians are entitled to know why.
They are entitled to know who the off-takers were, the prices and discounts at which transactions were executed, the fees that changed hands, who approved the arrangements, and which institution ultimately carried the losses.
They are also entitled to know whether the risks identified by the IMF and World Bank have been properly addressed, and whether the government has a credible plan to prevent similar losses in the future.
Two major international financial institutions have now raised serious concerns about the management and monitoring of risks surrounding Ghana’s gold-related operations. Parliament has also taken the first procedural step towards scrutiny.
The next step should be transparency.
The Minority will therefore continue to press for a full parliamentary inquiry and for the disclosure of the information necessary to establish what happened to Ghana’s money, who made the relevant decisions, and who ultimately paid the price.
Ghanaians deserve competent stewardship of a potentially valuable policy, backed by proper oversight and transparent accounting — not explanations that leave the central questions unanswered.
